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Culture, Self-construal and Social Cognition:
Evidence from Cross-Cultural and Priming Studies
Ulrich Kühnen, Jacobs University Bremen, Germany,
u.kuehnen@jacobs-university.de
Members of different cultures vary in basic social psychological processes, such as value
orientation, attitudes, attitude-behavior relations, person perception and attribution of
observed behavior. Previous researchers have traced back these differences to the
respective culture members’ self-construal: Westerners define their self primarily in
independent terms, whereas Asians are more likely to define their selves in interdependent
ways. This difference in construing the self in turn affects the above mentioned
judgmental processes. However, when relying on cross-cultural studies alone, the critical
role of the self cannot directly be tested. In this chapter I argue that the accessibility of
either independent or interdependent self-knowledge plays a critical role, because
judgments are assimilated to either autonomous –or social– contents to the degree that
independent –or interdependent– self-knowledge is accessible in the judgmental situation.
If so, making self-knowledge of one kind or the other temporarily accessible, should
mirror cross-cultural differences. I will review a series of studies confirming this
assumption. These studies will be discussed with regard to their implications a) for the
role of the self in judgment formation and b) for the flexibility of cultural differences.

How does culture affect individual thinking, feeling, and action? What are the psychological
mediators by which culture affects individual experience and social cognition, including
political judgment and decision making? Markus and Kitayama (1991) argued in their highly
influential article in Psychological Review, that one of the critical variables by which culture
affects the way we think, feel, and act is the individual construal of the self. Culture, so they
argued, affects how we construe our identity, and this self-construal in turn influences
subjective experience in various domains. In particular Markus and Kitayama differentiated
between two fundamentally different perspectives on the self. Within the independent construal,
the self is seen as fundamentally different from others. Important self-definitions refer to one’s
autonomous features, such as traits, abilities, and personal attitudes. This way of defining the
self is most prominent in Western, individualist societies. The interdependent perspective which
is typical for East Asian, collectivist culture members, stresses the fundamental connectedness
of the self to others. Important self-definitions within this perspective refer to one’s social roles,
group memberships or personal relations to important others. Whenever a psychological process
implicates the self, the degree of independence-interdependence will affect the outcome.
Markus and Kitayama thus argued that a person’s sense of the self is influenced by his or her
cultural background and influences in turn how the person thinks, feels and acts. But how
exactly does this influence come about? What are the exact psychological processes by which
the self affects individual experience?
Social Cognition of the Self
In order to partly answer this question, I put forward a Social Cognition perspective on
the self. Within this perspective, the self can be conceived of as a knowledge structure
containing the total amount of information an individual encodes in memory across the lifespan (Hannover, 1997; Linville & Carlston, 1994; Markus, 1977; for a recent review see
Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). At any given moment only a subset of this entirety of selfknowledge can be retrieved from memory. This subset can include both independent and
interdependent pieces of self-knowledge. Within this view the relative accessibility of
independent or interdependent knowledge mediates the self’s influence on individual
experience. Accessibility describes the ease with which a certain piece of information can be
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retrieved from memory. A certain piece of self-knowledge is more accessible, the more recently
(situational or temporary accessibility) and the more frequently (chronic accessibility) it has
been retrieved from memory (Higgins & Bargh, 1987). Accordingly, inter-individual
differences in self-construal can be interpreted as differences in the relative chronic accessibility
of independent versus interdependent self-knowledge. This applies for instance to cultures:
Individualist culture members encounter social contexts fostering an independent self-view
more frequently than do members of collectivist societies, who on the other hand are more
frequently exposed to contexts fostering an interdependent self-view. While encountering either
independent or interdependent social contexts, the respective kind of self-knowledge is
activated over and over again, thus becoming chronically accessible from memory (Hannover,
1997). At the same time, intra-individual differences in the accessibility of independent and
interdependent self-knowledge may result from being exposed to contextual factors which
temporarily prime self-knowledge of one kind or the other (Hannover, 1997). Chronic and
temporary sources of construct accessibility are functionally equivalent (Higgins & Bargh,
1987).
This Social Cognition perspective offers the possibility to link cross-cultural research
(which by definition rests on investigating inter-individual differences) to experimental
approaches as frequently used in social cognition research. If indeed the self is one of the
critical mediators for cultures’ influence on thinking and judgment (as suggested by crosscultural research), and if furthermore chronic and temporary sources of construct accessibility
are functionally equivalent (as proposed within social cognition research), then it follows that
experimentally manipulating the accessibility of self-knowledge of one kind or another should
result in the same differences on subsequent judgments as the ones we know from comparing
people with individualist or respectively collectivist cultural backgrounds (Gardner, Gabriel, &
Lee, 1999; Haberstroh, Oyserman, Schwarz, Kühnen, & Ji, 2002; Hannover & Kühnen, 2004,
2007; Kühnen & Haberstroh, 2004).
Researchers have identified several priming techniques by which the accessibility of
independent and interdependent self-knowledge can be manipulated. For instance, Trafimow
and colleagues (Trafimow, Triandis & Goto, 1991; Ybarra & Trafimow, 1998) asked American
and Asian research participants to think either about what they have in common with their
family and friends or what distinguishes them from these relevant others. In a subsequent selfdescription task, participants used more independent terms after having thought about
differences than after having listed commonalities with their family and friends. Another
priming technique has been developed by Gardner et al. (1999). These authors had their
(American) research participants read a paragraph about a trip to a city. In one condition, the
paragraph included first-person singular pronouns only (such as I, me, mine, etc.), whereas in
the other condition first-person plural pronouns were used in the text (e.g., we, us, ourselves,
etc.). After having circled these pronouns, all participants faced the same open-ended selfdescription task as in the Trafimow et al. (1991) study. As predicted, participants in the firstperson singular condition described themselves in more independent terms than participants in
the first person plural condition.
Self-Construal and Value Endorsement
How does accessible self-knowledge of one kind or the other affect judgment and decision
making? Independent self-knowledge refers to an individual’s attitudes, traits, and abilities that
distinguish the person from others (i.e., to autonomous semantic contents). In contrast,
interdependent self-knowledge describes an individual’s affiliation to others and to particular
social contexts (i.e., it contains social semantic contents). Many authors have shown that people
use the mental categories which can most easily be retrieved from memory, with judgments
being assimilated towards the denotative and connotative aspects of the activated category
(Bargh, 1997; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, & Nisbett, 1998; Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977).
Therefore, if independent self-knowledge is accessible, be it either situationally due to previous
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priming or chronically to a person’s cultural background, autonomous contents about the self
should guide information processing with incoming new information being assimilated toward
them. Likewise, if interdependent self-knowledge is accessible either through priming or culture,
social contents about the self should figure more prominently in the respondent’s mind.
Accordingly, judgments can be expected to be assimilated to these social contents.
This line of argumentation has several implications for (political) judgment and decision
making, including value endorsement, political attitudes, attitude-behavior relations and
attribution of political attitudes in others. There is ample empirical evidence that Westerners and
Easterners have different values, with Western culture members endorsing primarily
individualist values, while East Asians endorse collectivist values more strongly. Does
independent and interdependent self-knowledge have a causal influence on value judgments?
The already mentioned study by Gardner and colleagues (1999) suggests that this is indeed true.
After their participants had circled either I, me or mine, etc. in the one condition, or we, us,
ourselves, etc. in the other, they did not only fulfill a self-description task, but in addition they
answered several value questions taken from Schwartz’s (1992) value inventory, some of which
referring to individualist values others to collectivist ones. The results were threefold: First, as
described above participants’ self-descriptions were influenced by the preceding pronoun
circling task. Second, participants in the independent prime condition endorsed individualist
values more strongly than collectivist ones, with this difference being reversed for
interdependent primed participants. Third, and most importantly, a mediation analysis showed
that the effect of the experimental priming on value endorsement was mediated by the kind of
activated self-knowledge. The we-primed participants endorsed collectivist values more strongly,
because interdependent self-knowledge had been rendered accessible by the priming technique.
Likewise having circled I, me, and mine activated independent self-knowledge and as a
consequence participants endorsed individualist values primarily. This effect shows the causal
impact of independent or interdependent self-knowledge being accessible on value judgments.
Priming self-knowledge of one kind or the other thus mirrored cross-cultural differences between
the members of individualist versus collectivist cultures. In a second study this study’s central
findings were conceptually replicated with participants from the US and Hong Kong.
Self-Construal and Attitude Formation
The same line of argumentation can be applied to the formation of attitudes. There is a
long standing debate about the stability versus flexibility of attitudes. While some attitudes can
be directly retrieved from memory and are therefore more stable, others have to be formed on
the spot. At least this latter kind of attitudes are partially influenced by pieces of knowledge
being accessible in that very moment, and are therefore subject to the impact of situational
priming. If the respective attitudes are related to independence-interdependence, priming selfknowledge of one kind or the other should alter them. This is for instance the case with regard
to attitudes toward affirmative action (Kemmelmeier, 2003). Affirmation action policies are to a
certain extent incompatible with the Western ideal of an independent individual, because within
affirmative action individuals are judged on the grounds of their group membership.
Accordingly, Ozawa, Crosby, and Crosby (1996) found that Japanese participants endorsed
affirmative action much stronger than American participants. Building on this research,
Kemmelmeier (2003) first primed either independent or interdependent self-knowledge in his
American research participants, before asking them to report their attitudes toward affirmation
policies. He found, that participants who were primed for the independent self subsequently
resisted stronger to affirmative action policies than interdependent primed participants. Hence,
the study by Kemmelmeier mirrors the cross-cultural findings by Ozawa et al. (1996) by means
of experimentally manipulating the accessibility of independent and interdependent selfknowledge, suggesting that political attitudes toward affirmative action are at least partially
flexible and influenced by accessible self-knowledge of one kind or the other.
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Yet not only the formation of attitudes is affected by accessible self-knowledge, but also
the impact of attitudes and subjective norms on behavior is influenced accordingly. Trafimow
and Finlay (1996) measured the extent to which participants’ self-construals reflect
independence or interdependence, respectively, using the self-construal scale developed by
Singelis (1994). The authors also measured attitudes, subjective norms (i.e., assumptions about
the expectations of others) and behavioral intentions in variety of domains. They were
interested in the predictability of behavioral intentions, based on attitudes and social norms.
Trafimow and Finlay (1996) predicted that attitudes should be more important for participants
with primarily independent selves, and hence, for them the attitude-intentions-correlation
should be higher than the norms-intentions correlation. By contrast, social norms should more
relevant for interdependent individuals, and accordingly for them behavioral intentions should
correlate higher with subjective norms than attitudes. The results confirmed these predictions.
While this study provides only indirect evidence of the causal impact of self-knowledge on the
respective correlation, Ybarra and Trafimow (1998) used an experimental manipulation to first
render either independent or interdependent self-knowledge accessible, before assessing the
same attitudes, subjective norms and behavioral intentions as the ones assessed by Trafimow
and Finlay (1996). After being primed for independence, behavioral intentions correlated higher
with attitudes than subjective norms, while this pattern was reversed after being primed for
interdependence. Thus, the findings by Ybarra and Finlay mirror the results from Trafimow and
Finlay, suggesting that independent and interdependent self-knowledge does indeed have a
causal impact on the relation of intentions to attitudes versus subjective norms.
Building on this research Yugay and Kühnen (2006) recently investigated how a person
who behaved according either to his or her attitudes or subjective norms, respectively, would be
perceived and judged by individuals with accessible independent or interdependent selfknowledge. If people with an independent self decide for themselves to behave according to
their attitudes rather than subjective norms, they might as well appreciate, if others behave
similarly. These individuals may regard it as an indication of weakness to behave according to
subjective norms. Interdependent individuals by contrast are more willing to behave according
to their subjective norms, and so they may also value, if others decide in the same way.
Confirming social expectation for them can be considered a means to strengthen the
interdependence with others, whereas making one’s decision according to one’s attitudes rather
than subjective norms may threaten this interdependence.
In order to answer this question, we used similar material as Trafimow and Finlay
(1996). We measured participants’ self-construal by means of Singelis’ self-construal scale
(1994) and classified them into those with a rather independent construal of the self and those
with a rather interdependent one (median split). In addition, we used the pronoun circling task
described above (Gardner et al., 1999) in order to activate either independent or interdependent
self-knowledge. Our participants then received little vignettes, in which target persons were
described experiencing a conflict between personal attitudes and assumptions about the
expectations of others (i.e., their subjective norms). The scenarios were similar to the ones used
in Trafimow’s studies. Our participants were also informed that these target persons behaved
either according to their attitudes or to subjective norms. All participants judged the liking for
these targets on several dimensions. The results were in line with the predictions and showed
that participants with an independent self-construal, as measured by the Singelis’ scale, liked
the target person better, if he or she acted according to his or her attitudes rather than subjective
norms. This finding was reversed for interdependent participants.
In addition, we found a similar pattern for the priming conditions. Participants in the
independent prime condition liked the target person better, if he or she behaved according to
personal attitudes rather than subjective norms. Again, this pattern was reversed for participants
in the interdependent prime condition. Together these results show that independent and
interdependent self-knowledge, if accessible, influences not only how individuals make
decisions for themselves, but also how they interpret and judge decisions made by others. As in
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the previously described cases, priming self-knowledge of one kind or the other mirrors
findings from inter-individual comparisons between persons who differ with regard to what
self-knowledge is invariably accessible to them.
Self-construal and Attribution
While in the latter study all relevant information about the target persons was directly
given to the judging research participants, in natural settings reasons about why a certain person
acted in a given way can usually only be inferred by attribution processes. One of the most
pervasive tendencies in attribution processes is the tendency to attribute observed behavior to
internal features of the actors, such as his or her traits or attitudes, while not taking situational
influences sufficiently into account. One of the most frequently studied consequences of this
kind of dispositionalism is the correspondence bias, which refers to attributing behavior to the
actor’s attitudes that correspond with the behavior, even if one learns that the performed
behavior was socially constrained. In one of the most frequently used experimental paradigms
participants read an essay about a controversial issue (such as capital punishment) and learned
that the author was told by someone else to argue either in favor or against this respective issue.
In other words, participants learned that the behavior was socially constrained. Subsequently,
participants are asked to infer the author’s real attitude. The classic finding is that, despite the
fact that participants are informed that the author had no choice in writing either a pro- or antiessay, participants ascribe a more positive attitude to pro- than anti- authors, reflecting the
tendency to attribute the behavior (i.e., writing the pro- versus anti-essay) to a corresponding
attitude (Jones & Harris, 1967).
Numerous studies converge in showing that Western and Eastern culture members hold
very different concepts of agency: Westerners see agency as a property of the individual,
whereas for Easterners, it is the group or one’s social surroundings that is the origin of agency
(Kagitcibasi, 2005; Kitayama & Uchida, 2005; Markus, Uchida, Omoregie, Townsend, &
Kitayama, 2006). One of the consequences of this different conceptualization of agency is the
different extent to which these cultures’ members are prone to commit dispositional biases in
attribution. Although dispositionalism has been shown to be quite robust across cultures (Chiu,
Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999), there are at least certain
circumstances in which members of “Eastern interdependence” cultures seem to apply
situational explanations as well (Choi et al., 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994). That is, both
Easterners and Westerners think dispositionally, however, they diverge in the extent to which
they additionally consider situational information when making attributions. Whereas
Westerners most likely ignore the context, regardless of whether it is applicable to the judgment
or not and irrespective of how salient or predictive it is (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Miyamoto &
Kitayama, 2002), Easterners take situational factors into account when information about those
factors is applicable to the judgment at hand, particularly when the information is salient or
highly predictive.
In a recent study by Miyamoto and Kitayama (2002), Western (American) and Asian
(Japanese) research participants read either a pro- or con-essay on capital punishment and were
informed that the essay writer (a student) had been told by his professor to be pro or con in
his/her writing. In addition, Miyamoto and Kitayama varied the length of the provided essay,
assuming that a long essay should mistakenly be seen as more diagnostic for the authors’ real
attitude than a rather short essay. As a consequence, both Western and Eastern participants were
expected to exhibit the correspondence bias, if the provided essay was long. If, however, the
essay was rather short, Miyamoto and Kitayama predicted that Asians would take the situational
impact of the social constraint into account. This should, hence, reduce the observable
correspondence bias. For Western research participants on the other hand this was not expected
to be the case. Irrespective of whether the provided essay was long (i.e., “diagnostic”) or short
(i.e., “non-diagnostic”), these participants should attribute more positive attitudes to pro as
compared to con authors. These predictions were fully confirmed.
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As the above reasoning would suggest, we recently tested whether priming independent
versus interdependent self-knowledge would lead to similar effects as the cultural difference
(Hannover, Kühnen, Pöhlmann, & Roeder, in review). The design of our study essentially
followed the experiment by Miyamoto and Kitayama (2002) with culture as a factor being
replaced by experimental priming (our research participants were German students only). We
also changed the topic, since a question regarding capital punishment would be inappropriate in
Germany. Rather the essays that we used were either in favor of or against banning an extremist
Neo-Nazi political party –an issue which is actually a matter of public debate in Germany
currently. The essay either supported banning the party or was opposed to it. In addition, the
essay was either rather long or short. All participants were informed that the essay’s author (a
student) was asked by his professor to write about the topic in the respective way.
Subsequently, the participants were asked to rate the essay author’s real attitude toward banning
the party on several scales.
Similar to the pattern from the study by Miyamoto and Kitayama, we found that
independent primed participants exhibited correspondence bias, irrespective of whether the
essay was long or short, respectively. That is, these participants attributed more positive
attitudes to authors in the pro as compared to the con condition, with this difference being
independent of the essay’s length. This was not so, however, for interdependence primed
participants. They exhibited correspondence bias only if the essay was long, but not when it was
short and supposedly non-diagnostic for the author’s real attitude. That is, if the essay was
rather short, these individuals took the situational factor into account (i.e., the professor asking
the student to write this essay in the respective way) and, hence, they less likely attributed to the
author an attitude supported in the essay.
Both these studies provide empirical support for the notion that independent and
interdependent self-knowledge has a causal impact on how we view others and interpret their
behavior, either as being a result of the actor (applying the Western conception of agency) or
taking more likely contextual factors into account. Making self-knowledge of one kind or the
other temporarily accessible, again mirrored the cross-cultural comparison.
Conclusion
The studies reviewed here converge in showing the importance of independent and
interdependent self-knowledge for various kinds of judgments such as value endorsement,
attitudes toward affirmative action, the relation of attitudes versus subjective norms to
behavioral intentions, person perception and attribution inferences. Combined, these findings
suggest that the individual construal of the self is indeed one of the critical mediators for the
impact of culture on judgment and decision making as already suggested by Markus and
Kitayama (1991). The combined approach of cross-cultural studies and priming experiments
allows transcending the shortcomings of the quasi-experimental designs in cross-cultural
research, in that it provides direct evidence for the effect of self-knowledge, if accessible, of one
kind or the other.
At the same time, these studies also challenge cross-cultural research in a certain way.
Cultural differences are at least up to a certain extent rather flexible, as the priming studies
reveal. This is not to say that there are no stable and reliable cultural differences. The challenge
is rather theoretical: if theories about cultural difference refer to the stable aspects of culture
alone, they will fail to explain intra-cultural and even intra-individual variation. Incorporating
insights from Social Cognition research about the equivalence of chronic and situational
accessibility of mental concepts and their impact on human judgment and decision making can
help overcome this shortcoming in order to better understand how culture and mind make each
other up.
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